

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

U.S. House of Representatives
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTIETH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON

H. R. 2319

A BILL TO PROMOTE THE NATIONAL SECURITY BY PROVIDING FOR A NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH SHALL BE ADMINISTERED BY A SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND FOR A DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, A DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, AND A DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WITHIN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, AND FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

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get this system into full operation, with the improved performance and greater economies that it ought to give us.

Mr. BOGGS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Dorn.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Secretary, I am glad to see that this central intelligence agency was included in this bill. It was my observation in the late war that it was a lack of intelligence on our potential enemies, regarding their military strength, that caused a great deal of our difficulty during the stages of the war.

Do you think that the director of the Central Intelligence should be a member of this war council? Do you think that that would help this more forcibly bring to the attention of the General Staff and the Secretary of National Defense, these things, if the director of Central Intelligence were included in the war council?

Secretary PATTERSON. No, sir.

Mr. DORN. It would not?

Secretary PATTERSON. No, sir; I would not include him. The bill, in providing for a unified intelligence activity, I believe, will cure the ills that you mentioned, that we had in 1941, and to a lesser degree in the years that followed it, too.

We had the illustration in what happened at Pearl Harbor where you have separate systems of intelligence, not integrated except as they may talk to one another at lunch or something like that.

Mr. DORN. Well, Mr. Secretary, Congressman Jenkins asked a good question there. There is some doubt in my mind, and I understand pretty well the over-all picture of this national security bill—that is the general characteristics of it in the higher bracket—as to some parts. Take, for instance, a key base like Alaska, which in my opinion is the most important base outside of the continental United States today.

You have a chief of naval operations in that particular locality, and then you have a commander of the ground forces of the Army. You have an air force chief there. What provisions under this setup would you have for a merger in that local area?

Secretary PATTERSON. The bill provides that the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for commands overseas. That is shown on this chart by the Joint Chiefs of Staff box, and the line running to the unified field commands in the lower left-hand corner. It is also provided for in the text of the bill, in section 111. Section 111, paragraph D-3, provided or provides, "To establish unified commands in strategic areas, where such unified commands are in the interest of national security."

Mr. DORN. That will be the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to see that that is done?

Secretary PATTERSON. They do that today, by the way, by a system set up in December of 1946. The Joint Chiefs of Staff finally agreed upon the boundaries of overseas commands, and a single officer of some one of the three services, is responsible and in command of that area.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to take up too much time, but I would like to ask this. Some military powers in the past history have their officers of general rank, and they have required that they familiarize themselves with battleships and flying of planes, and most of them were required to be able to fly planes, to run a tank,

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Mr. WILSON. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boggs.

Mr. BOGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to call your attention to Title II, Coordination for National Security, on pages 18 and 19, at the end of section 201 (u), it says.

The Council—

meaning the National Security Council—

shall be composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and such other members as the President may designate from time to time.

What does that mean? How far can the President go?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, it was designed to make it possible for him to designate, for example, the chairmen of the Armed Services committees of the House, and the comparable committee in the Senate, of any one that he felt would make a contribution to lining up all of the elements that go to contribute to our security, executive, legislative, and military.

Mr. BOGGS. Could he go outside of the official Government and designate anyone else, any other private citizen, of this country or any citizen of any other country to put on that Board, according to that phrase?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, the language, I would think, would leave it, would make it possible for him to designate any citizen of this country. He, obviously, would not—well, I say obviously—it is inconceivable to me that he would put any alien on that committee.

Mr. BOGGS. But it is entirely up to the President.

Secretary FORRESTAL. For example, I have adverted to scientists as if I did not think they were useful. I think they are mighty useful. He might want to have, for example, on this Board the leading scientists, such as a man like Vannevar Bush, who was, during this war tremendously useful, because there is no question that the field of science will be a source of tremendous contribution to any plans that exist for either offensive warfare or defensive warfare.

Mr. BOGGS. In the event the President went beyond the personnel of the Government, who would confirm such appointment to that Council?

Secretary FORRESTAL. That is a matter for the Congress to decide. My own view would be that confirmation by the Senate in this case, would not be necessary—but you could weigh it either way. If the Congress thought confirmation were wiser, I certainly would have no objection.

Mr. BOGGS. My concern, sir, is because we have the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency directly under the National Security Council. In my own opinion, I think intelligence is one of the most important provisions that this bill carries, and I am inclined to have some fears on the generality here, that the President may put anyone he sees fit on this National Security Council. There is no limitation, no provision for confirmation by the Senate, and that Council has all the information in the world available to it.

Now, it seems to me that there should be a provision with more cure and more restriction in that portion of the bill, to safeguard all of our rights here.

Mr. BOGGS. I was referring to the language in the bill, sir. It specifies, "Any commissioned officer of the United States Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Air Force." Well now, when you specify it that way, that restricts it, I think, if I am correct, under rules of statutory interpretation. If we said there "any commissioned officers of the armed forces," that certainly would have included the officers of the Marine Corps.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes, sir; it would indeed.

Mr. BOGGS. But this language leaves some doubt in my mind.

That is on page 20, sir, the particular language I am speaking about. This particular language relates to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, beginning with line 20.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Oh, yes.

Mr. BOGGS. You could cover that by saying "any commissioned officers of the United States armed forces."

Secretary FORRESTAL. I think so. There was certainly no thought of denial. I mean, any failure to provide clear availability of Marines for any of these, either Joint Staff, Central Intelligence, or any of the others, was an unconscious omission.

Mr. BOGGS. I just have one other question and I will be through. If this bill becomes a law, how long, in your opinion, will it take to effect the organization from the standpoint of increasing our national defense efficiency, and lowering the cost?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, I would break my answer into two parts. I would say for the accomplishment of the immediate objectives, that the Navy, at least, sees the principal and most desirable results of this bill, namely the ability to get down to quicker planning, to a study, to a perspective of our whole war effort, and what we shall need in the future to provide for this country's security. Those objectives, I think, might be accomplished within 3 years.

The purpose of this legislation, as I view it, is to provide a flexible medium through which constant changes could properly be made because the world, the tempo and the fluidity of the world, are greatly heightened today, and I would not like to see anything in this legislation that took frozen assumptions. As I said in my statement, the Maginot Line was such a frozen assumption for the French. I think certain conceptions of gadget warfare, could be a dangerous, frozen assumption. The assumption that science alone could protect us would be another Maginot Line. This organization should be conceived as fluid and flexible, and as free as possible from the idea that we can place reliance upon anything of the past, and at the same time not to place equal reliance on the past is fruitless and unnecessary; it is a mixture of the two.

Mr. BOGGS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Mr. Karsten is next.

Mr. KARSTEN. Mr. Secretary, the reason our committee is considering this bill is because we are the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. I wonder if you could tell the committee just about how much money might be saved if this bill is finally passed?

Secretary FORRESTAL. I would think any speculation, I think any statement of opinion about what would be saved, would be pure utter speculation.

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requested a certain type of rocket be procured by Army Ordnance. Army Ordnance believed that the Navy (through N. D. R. C.) had developed a more suitable rocket. At their request, the Navy Bureau of Ordnance made the particulars of its development available to the Army Air Forces for decision as to suitability. This is only one of many examples of inter-service cooperation and liaison which extends to all types of arms.

G. F. HUSSEY, Jr.,
Vice Admiral, United States Navy,
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance,
H. T. WALSH,
Captain, United States Navy.
By direction.

Mr. BUSHEY. Mr. Secretary, under the National Security Council I would like to talk for a moment about the Central Intelligence Agency. Is that the same group that is now known as the Central Intelligence Group located at Fourteenth and L?

Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BUSHEY. That is their headquarters.

Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, the assumption is, at least the assumption in my mind is, that the Central Intelligence Agency, as specified in this bill, would assume the functions now discharged by the Central Intelligence Group, because the creation of the Central Intelligence Group follows the pattern which is envisaged in this draft.

Mr. BUSHEY. I was a little disturbed the other day when an article appeared in the French newspaper France-Soir, of Paris, France, dated March 31, regarding this group. I had not seen a similar release in any American papers, and I wondered about it.

The headline read thus:

The United States Creates a Secret Service in Time of Peace.

The subheadline is as follows:

Its chief, Admiral Hillenkoetter, American Naval Attaché to France, shall be directly responsible to Truman.

The article reads as follows:

Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, American Naval Attaché to France since last summer, left today on board the S. S. America to return to Washington. The reason for this departure can now be released. He is named to one of the most important assignments in the American administration. He is to be the Director General of the Central Intelligence Group.

The CIG is the first and major service of information created by America in time of peace. It will control all foreign secret intelligence and will operate and coordinate other services of information of the Departments of State, War, and Navy.

Admiral Hillenkoetter shall be directly responsible to the President only.

In his capacity as Chief of the CIG he shall have to inform the Army, the Navy, and the United States Government of the intentions of all foreign powers and their capabilities. He shall be responsible for the security of the United States in case of sudden attack by arms or atomic means. The lesson of Pearl Harbor is one of the principal reasons which motivated the creation of this permanent service of information in the United States.

Admiral Hillenkoetter is at 49 one of the youngest admirals of the United States Navy. He was born at St. Louis, Mo., and his grandparents came from Holland in 1848.

I will not take the time to read the rest of this, but I will insert it in the record, with your permission, Mr. Chairman. It deals with his personal background and has no bearing on my question.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it may be inserted.

Secretary FORRESTAL. That is correct.

Mr. BROWN. The Secret Service has certain duties and responsibilities written out, word by word, in the statutes.

Secretary FORRESTAL. It is a problem for the Congress and the Executive Departments, Mr. Brown. As I say, exploration certainly could be profitable.

However, there is not the slightest question, and I can assure you from my own experience and knowledge that you need someone in this Government who is going to be charged with that aspect of national security.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, but my attention has been called three times to the fact that we have run 15 minutes overtime, and we are violating the rule of the House under the 5-minute rule.

In addition, the whip has called us on the floor.

We are adjourned to Tuesday morning, at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Tuesday, April 29, 1947.)

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson, do you have a question?

Mr. WILSON. Admiral, at the outset, I think you and General Norstad are to be congratulated for the bill that you wrote. Let me ask you just these few questions.

Do you feel that the bill could be strengthened by an amendment or an inclusion in the bill setting out the basic functions of the Marine Corps?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson, may I interrupt you there? I forgot, but here again we have members of the Rules Committee, and I wondered if it would be all right to get to the members of the Rules Committee first.

Mr. WILSON. It is all right with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. I have just one or two questions. I have not had an opportunity, Admiral, to study this statement, as I should have, but as I understood your statement here at the beginning of your testimony, you feel that as we get away from the war period, and the various orders which have been issued under the emergency powers maintained during the war period, that it will be necessary to write an outline into the statute, and to fix the functions and the responsibilities of the various branches; is this so?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I believe that the outline form of our national defense and national-security structure should be established by statute.

Mr. BROWN. And do you think that this bill does that properly?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think that this bill does it properly. As I said in my prepared statement, this bill represents a compromise between opposing views, and I believe it is the optimum settlement of the matter, for the time being.

Mr. BROWN. How do you fit together your statement that you should define by statute the duties and responsibilities, and the provision in the bill for this Central Intelligence Agency which provides that that agency shall have the functions and the powers as outlined in Executive orders issued by the President. These Executive orders were printed on the Federal Register some day or some time in the past, which nobody can remember or find, and which can be changed in 3 seconds by the signature of the President, to make the Central Intelligence Agency have entirely different functions and power? Do you think that is good law or administration or is that writing out plainly in the statute what the powers, functions and responsibilities should be?

Admiral SHERMAN. My understanding of the effect of this bill in that regard is that it would freeze the order specifically referred to, which is President Truman's letter of January 22, that it would freeze that letter and make it permanent until such time as the Congress passed an adequate organic law for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. BROWN. Well, of course, it does not say that in the law. If that is your understanding, it might be a good idea to write it into the statute, might it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. If this language—

Mr. BROWN. The order can be amended at any time. I do not know how many thousands of Executive orders which have the force and effect of law have been issued here in the last few years; nobody

Mr. HARNES. Well, yes, I quite agree with you that is is a step in the right direction. I would like to see the agency continued. I do want to see some limitation put upon its activity and I think it wise to write into this bill limitations as to its activity so that its authority will be definite.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, we feel that this reference here was merely a stop-gap device to cover the possibilities that this bill would go through in advance of the other one.

Mr. HARNES. Admiral, I am sorry that I must leave in just a minute, but there is one other thing that I am interested in—or, rather, two things. I am interested in obtaining your opinion of the merging of the two scientific research divisions of the War and Navy Departments and how you think this consolidation will work out.

Admiral SHERMAN. We visualize, sir, that the research and development activities of the military departments would be handled essentially as at present, with one difference.

At the present time, we have a Joint Research and Development Board. That Board is coordinating our activity in those fields; it is establishing priorities, preventing duplication and doing its best to make sure that we get the maximum results from the funds that are available.

Mr. HARNES. Will there be any competition between the two services, in their research and development program?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; the elimination of that competition is provided for now, and since neither the Secretary of the Navy nor the Secretary of War could be the arbiter as between the two departments, they have agreed, and turned over to Doctor Bush the power of decision.

Now, in this bill, where there would be a Secretary of National Defense who would be impartial as between the two Departments, that power of decision reverts back to him.

That leads to another interesting point in connection with our present organization. We have the Army-Navy Munitions Board, the Joint Research and Development Board, each of which has a chairman who has been given power of decision in that particular field.

This bill would take the power of decision back into one man who would be a member of the Security Council, a member of the Cabinet who would be responsible for the eventual results, as well as for making decisions in these two special fields, so that these powers would be concentrated rather than dispersed in a series of referees who are not necessarily fully informed as to the over-all situation.

Mr. HARNES. You think it is a healthy thing to eliminate competition between the military services research and development?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think it is advisable to keep those aspects of competition which provide incentive, providing that the cost is not too great.

Mr. HARNES. But to abolish the overlapping functions.

Admiral SHERMAN. Certainly, there should be one central authority which is prepared to step in when the competition becomes unhealthy. In my own experience in connection with the development of technical material in the Navy, I have had projects to achieve the same result put in the hands of different manufacturers which, in a sense, was competition; but there was someone who controlled that competition, and who could turn off the financial support of the competition when it became wasteful.

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Mr. KARSTEN. You do not believe under the bill as it is now written, it would be possible to transfer an Air Corps officer to the Ground Forces?

Mr. BRACKEN. I will not say it will not be possible, no. I think it will be impracticable.

More than that, it will be improbable that they would ever be transferred.

Mr. KARSTEN. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rich?

Mr. RICH. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown?

Mr. BROWN. I have one question, Mr. Bracken.

I was not here yesterday when you gave your statement but I have gone through it as best I could. I have not found any comment on Central Intelligence Agency. I may have missed it.

Have you given thought or study to the writing into the statutes of a provision for a Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. BRACKEN. No, sir, we have not given detailed thought to that. We have approved the Central Intelligence Agency. We think these various boards, munitions board, research and development board, central intelligence that the Congress has provided for is honest-to-God unification.

Mr. BROWN. Is there not any danger that Congress is providing a little bit more than unification, that Congress is providing by legislation as it is now drawn, for military control of both our foreign and domestic policy and our economy?

Mr. BRACKEN. I think there is some danger of that just sliding through this bill, yes sir; yes.

Mr. BROWN. Not sliding through. You are either in control or not in control, in the final analysis.

Do you see any danger of just a little bit too much military control as a result of this legislation?

Mr. BRACKEN. I think the Central Intelligence Board could very well be headed by a civilian as one safeguard.

Mr. BROWN. Do you think the Central Intelligence Agency should have its authority and functions based upon this same sort of Presidential Executive order, you mentioned a moment ago as not good law, or do you think that Congress should say what the authority, jurisdiction, and functions should be?

Mr. BRACKEN. I think the Congress should also state that; yes, sir.

Mr. BROWN. You made the comment a while ago, as I recall, that an Executive order could be changed the next day, and of course, it can be. An Executive order can be written, repealed, withdrawn, or whatever you want to call it. It can be amended or changed, or a new Executive order can be written tomorrow.

Mr. BRACKEN. That is right.

Mr. BROWN. And by a stroke of the pen the President can change completely the functions and authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. Do you think that is good law?

Mr. BRACKEN. That act does provide for the Central Intelligence Agency to report to the National Security Council and be under its supervision and direction.

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Mr. BROWN. I rather think I would like to have a civilian. There is a feeling of greater security if a civilian is entrusted with such power.

For that reason we have constantly kept a civilian in the positions of Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, and this bill provides that the Secretary of National Defense shall be a civilian.

I think it is for the same reason exactly, to safeguard and to make certain there is not to be any usurpation of power.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Brown, were you in here when General Vandenberg testified?

Mr. BROWN. No, but I have heard some criticism of General Vandenberg as far as that is concerned.

Mr. DORN. He is not going to be here any longer. He covered this thing thoroughly. This Central Intelligence Agency is primarily concerned and almost entirely concerned with intelligence pertaining to military and foreign.

I tell you the crowd you have to worry about is the FBI and Tam Clark.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And your Un-American Activities Committee.

Mr. BROWN. I understand all that. I understood what General Vandenberg said, and I understand that General Vandenberg has been relieved, and there has been another officer put in command.

I would like to get a final comment from the witness. I wonder if the witness can make some comment on that, and later, if he furnishes suggested amendments to the committee as the chairman requested, he will furnish any amendments that his association may suggest that will limit this section, and give greater protection to the mass of ordinary American citizens.

Mr. BRACKEN. Yes, sir.

I would just like to express one thought at the present time that has been bothering a lot of folks about placing a military man at the head of this particular organization.

That is the idea that a military man would serve a tour of duty as head of Central Intelligence and would move over from that to command a ship at sea or a regiment somewhere.

If Central Intelligence is to amount to anything at all, it should have to have continuity in its direction. Whether that could be obtained by some other method or not, I do not know.

I would like to give some thought to it to make a better and more thoughtful suggestion to the committee on the basis of a little more thinking.

Mr. BROWN. With the consent of the chairman, I wonder if the witness can and will furnish the committee with his thoughts and suggestions on this particular section of the bill when he submits the other material to the committee.

Mr. BRACKEN. I would like to have an opportunity.

Mr. BROWN. Is that satisfactory to the chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Anything the gentleman from Ohio suggests.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARNESS. In that connection, are we going to have a representative from the Reserve officers of the Army here who might also collaborate with us and offer some suggestions?

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any suggestions as to the gentleman's name?

(b), that the Secretary of National Defense shall annually report to the Congress on "the expenditures, work and accomplishment of the National Defense Establishment." In order that the full range of the establishment's experience may be before you, I suggest that this section be enlarged specifically to require a frank evaluation of the effectiveness of its organizational structure and to require specific recommendations for further and closer integration of the services with respect to additional horizontal linkages between them should such appear to be desirable.

In conclusion, I cannot state too strongly my conviction that unification of the armed services at the top, with authoritative horizontal linkages between them at lower levels, is absolutely essential if we are to remain strong. We, as a nation, must be strong if we are to survive and carry the heavy responsibility which we have for preserving in the world our way of life. I believe that the plan presently before you will prove to be of enormous importance in the future in enabling us to do just that.

Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Judd?

Mr. JUDD. Dr. Bush, it is a real privilege to have you here, because anybody who was connected with the inside of the war is fully aware, probably more than the general public is, of the outstanding contributions that you and your associates made. Your judgment is not theoretical, but derived from first-hand experience during 4 years of tough going.

Dr. BUSH. It was 7 years.

Mr. JUDD. Our whole Nation's future and very existence depended on how well you and your scientific coworkers did your job.

I am grateful for your wholehearted endorsement of this plan, not as a final plan or a plan without any defects in it, but one which is a long step in the right direction and one which will give our country greater opportunity to use our brains and human resources as well as material resources to the full.

Dr. BUSH, did you have much to do with the intelligence work during the war?

Dr. BUSH. Of course I touched it in various capacities. For example, at the time the German V-1's were introduced, the intelligence which flowed in from OWI, from G-2 and OSS was brought together in one place and analyzed by a group that was set up by General Henry, then head of the New Developments Unit of the General Staff, and by myself. I supplied the technical and scientific group to analyze that scientific material.

On the basis of that work, we came to conclusions as to the German timetable on their plans and I had the job of briefing General Eisenhower on that when he took command in the European theater.

The contact that I had with the intelligence function was of that sort, on specific matters, and with the various intelligence agencies.

Mr. JUDD. I will not press it, then, because I thought you were more closely associated.

I am concerned as to whether in this bill the intelligence agency is given anywhere near the importance it deserves. I think it must be put up on a parity with your Research and Development Board, with the Munitions Board, and the like.

As far as I can understand the bill, it will not be a central agency but a joint agency, hydra-headed, which could weaken our intelligence rather than strengthen it.

Dr. BUSH. I second your thought there. I feel very strongly that in the postwar period we need to improve, in every way we possibly can do so, our intelligence work in this country.

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That is in no criticism of what we did during the war.

During the war, I was one of the users of intelligence. I was on the receiving end, usually, on that sort of thing, and I came to have a great deal of regard for some of the work that was being done, which I thought was excellent.

Nevertheless, in the postwar period, that is an exceedingly important part of our effort and, if there is any way we can strengthen it, I am all for it.

My difficulty is this: Looking over the bill and analyzing its provisions there, I cannot see how it would improve things as an organizational matter, for this reason:

The Central Intelligence Agency has provided for links with the Military Establishment and also with the State Department. It therefore could not, logically, it seems to me, be under the Secretary of National Defense.

It is a matter that the Secretary of National Defense and Secretary of State are jointly interested in.

It might report directly to the President, but it seems to me that the scheme that is provided for in the bill is a sound one from that standpoint.

Mr. Judd. It is under a council, really, of various secretaries, and I do not believe it will function as well as if one person were responsible.

If we were to fight a war tomorrow, we would fight it with the last war's weapons. If it comes 15 years from now, we will have different kinds of weapons and so will other nations. If we are caught flat-footed and they turn up with marked improvements that our intelligence has not revealed to us, it could be catastrophic, before we could prepare suitable defenses for the unknown weapon.

Dr. BUSH. There is another aspect that troubles me more than that.

I have had close contact with our Central Intelligence Group since it was formed, because that group, under General Vandenberg, had close contact with the Joint Research and Development Board of which I am Chairman, as he worked out his plans for scientific intelligence.

We worked very closely indeed with him on that and I think we were of some aid in helping that to become formulated.

However, we have had, since that Central Intelligence Group was formed, three chiefs in succession, and that bothers me. I can see the point of view of having a military officer assigned to that work. But it interferes with his career, and he hence does not feel it is a permanent assignment of importance enough to warrant his continued attention.

The alternative to that is a civilian head.

Personally, I feel that a civilian head would be better, if exactly the right man could be found for the purpose, but to find exactly the right man for a job of that sort, I grant, is very difficult indeed, because it takes a strange combination of talents and we have no national training ground in this country for ability of that sort.

However, under this bill, as I understand it, there is no requirement that the head of the agency be a military man or a civilian. I believe that this structure as is here worked out, provided the President of the United States will take enough interest in it to pay some attention to it, will operate effectively as anything I can propose. I cannot propose an alternative which I think better.

because our present Secretaries of War and of Navy are far-sighted men of vision who see this picture clearly.

However, as a permanent affair, it is far more reasonable to have that authority flow from the President to the Secretary of National Defense to the Board, which is his right arm in straightening out all matters of research and development throughout the Military Establishment.

Mr. LATHAM. Doctor, the machinery you speak of is set forth in section 114, Research and Development.

Dr. BUSH. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATHAM. Whether over that Board you will have a single Secretary, or Joint Chiefs of Staff would not make too much difference, as long as you have the machinery in this section.

Dr. BUSH. In the long run I think it would make a vast difference, and I believe that this Board, which operates on problems of research and development, has such an enormously difficult task—and it certainly has a task to produce a unitary national program in that field, with duplication eliminated, the gaps filled, and no overlap—it has such an exceedingly difficult task that it needs as simple a structure and as strong a backing as it possibly can get.

Mr. LATHAM. Senator Wadsworth.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I have no questions for the moment.

Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Lanham?

Mr. LANHAM. Dr. Bush, in the National Security Council and its set-up, I suppose you are familiar with that?

Dr. BUSH. Yes, sir.

Mr. LANHAM. Have you any fear that under that set-up, the military will dominate the civilian set-up during times of peace? Do you think it is overbalanced?

Dr. BUSH. No, sir; I haven't felt so, and in fact I have no fear of military combination in any such joint effort, having served in a good many of them in war and in peace. I find, in my own experience, that working with military men is a very pleasant and reassuring experience.

If there is any tendency of the military in this country to dominate the civilians, I have never seen it in my experience.

Mr. LANHAM. Do you feel there is any danger of the Central Intelligence Division becoming a Gestapo, or anything of that sort?

Dr. BUSH. I think there is no danger of that. The bill provides clearly that it is concerned with intelligence outside of this country, that it is not concerned with intelligence on internal affairs, and I think this is a safeguard against its becoming an empire.

We already have, of course, the FBI in this country, concerned with internal matters, and the collection of intelligence in connection with law enforcement internally. We have had that for a good many years. I think there are very few citizens who believe this arrangement will get beyond control so that it will be an improper affair.

Mr. LANHAM. That is all.

Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Busbey.

Mr. BUSBEY. No questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Dorn.

Mr. DORN. I would like to ask the doctor something about this blueprint business: Doctor, is it not a fact that it takes a pretty good while for radical, new developments in missiles and in means to con-

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William Koetter
Statement in file
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